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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAHf

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No.

v.

J

Priority No. 13

WENDY L. MUNSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the court of appeals misconstrue this Court's
directive in State v. Mendoza, 784 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), in
applying a correction of error standard of review to the trial
court's determination of reasonable suspicion?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is
State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (a copy is
contained in the addendum).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its decision reversing the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence
on November 7, 1991.

Following the denial of its petition for a

rehearing on January 30, 1992, the State timely filed a request
for an extension of time in which to file this petition, which
was granted.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider this

petition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Wendy L. Munsen, was charged with possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1990) (Record [R.] at 6). Following the trial court's
denial of her motion to suppress evidence, defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the reduced charge of possession of
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990)1 (R. 6, 18, 38,
24-30).
On November 7, 1991, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the
basis that the trial court erred in finding that there was
reasonable suspicion to seize defendant.

State v. Munsen, 821

P.2d 13, 16 (Utah App. 1991) (Garff, Russon JJ.).

Concurring in

the result only, Judge Jackson agreed with the trial court that

1

Although the original information was amended by
interlineation on February 2, 1990, the trial court apparently
neglected to insert the corresponding statute; thus, the
information in the record erroneously cites Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990).
2

there was reasonable suspicion to justify defendant's seizure,
but disagreed that the length and scope of the detention was
justified by the circumstances.

Munsen, 821 P.2d at 16-17

(Jackson, J. concurring).
The facts of the case as set out in the court of
appeals' opinion are sufficient for the purposes of this
petition:
On November 26, 1989f at about 3:30 a.m.,
Officer Jeff Jensen of the Midvale City
Police was patrolling the parking lot of
Smith's Food King in Midvale, Utah. This
store is open twenty-four hours a day.
Officer Jensen observed a pickup truck parked
"by itself" in the lot. On closer
observation, he noticed a man lying on the
seat of the truck, apparently working with
the car stereo.
Officer Jensen questioned the man, who
identified himself as Alan Hunter. The
vehicle registration, which Hunter produced
at the officer's request, indicated that
someone other than Hunter owned the vehicle.
Hunter stated he had purchased the truck at a
pawnshop. Officer Jensen noticed a driver's
license on the seat of the truck. The
license listed a woman's name and bore the
photograph of a woman. Hunter also stated
that he did not know where the license came
from. He offered that it might belong to his
girlfriend, who he said, was in the store.
During this questioning, Officer Jensen
noticed appellant Wendy L. Munsen exit the
supermarket and walk in the direction of the
truck. There were no other vehicles or
people near Officer Jensen and Hunter.
Officer Jensen intercepted Munsen to see
whether she could confirm Hunter's
explanation about who he was and what he was
doing, and to see whether she had a role in
any possible criminal activity.
Officer Jensen asked Munsen if she knew
Hunter. She replied that she had known him

3

for one yearf and that his name was "Hunt" or
"Hunter." Officer Jensen then had Munsen
wait in the patrol car while he obtained
field card information and ran a warrants
check on her. Because the check on Munsen
turned up several outstanding warrants,
Officer Jensen arrested her. During a search
of Munsen's person, incident to her arrest,
Officer Jensen discovered the controlled
substance, methamphetamine. Munsen was later
charged with possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony.
Munsen, 821 P.2d at 14.
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the trial
court ruled that Officer Jensen's actions "were reasonable and
proper under the circumstances" and that the "brief detention of
defendant to obtain 'field card' information and check for
outstanding warrants [was] reasonable" (R. 36-37).
INTRODUCTION
In its opinion below, the court of appeals departed
from this Court's directive in State v. Mendoza 784 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987), and applied a correction of error standard of review
to the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion.

The

opinion directly misconstrues Mendoza and is in conflict, not
only with Mendoza, but with previous panels of the court of
appeals.

As a result of the court of appeals' decision, the

precedent in this State concerning the standard of review to be
applied to a trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion
has become unsettled.

This Court should grant certiorari to

clarify this important question of law.

4

ARGUMENT
IN APPLYING A "CORRECTION OF ERROR" STANDARD
OF REVIEW TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF
REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION CONFLICTS WITH PRECEDENT FROM THIS
COURT AND PREVIOUS PANELS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS WHICH TREAT A DETERMINATION OF
REASONABLE SUSPICION AS A FACTUAL FINDING,
PROPERLY REVIEWED UNDER A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
STANDARD; THEREFORE THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT
CERTIORARI TO SETTLE THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION
OF LAW,
In State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991),
the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion in support of its denial of defendant's
motion to suppress.

However, in reviewing the lower court's

determination the Munsen majority misapplied controlling
precedent from this Court, citing State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987), as support for its erroneous treatment of reasonable
suspicion as a mixed question of fact and law, subject to a
correction of error standard of review.

Munsen, 821 P.2d at 15.

In so misconstruing Mendoza, which articulated a clearly
erroneous standard for review of a trial court's reasonable
suspicion determination, the Munsen majority established a direct
conflict with this Court and with previous panels of the court of
appeals.

Since Mendoza this Court has not suggested any

modification of the standard of review applicable to reasonable
suspicion determinations.

See, e.g., State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d

646, 649-51 (Utah 1989) (where issue was validity of stop based
on reasonable suspicion, this Court found no clear error in trial
court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to deny motion
5

to suppress); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38
(Utah 1989) (refuting State's assertion that judge erroneously
applied a probable cause standard instead of a reasonable
suspicion standard in suppression hearing, and noting that there
was no clear error in trial court's ruling that the facts failed
to support even an articulable suspicion).
With the exception of Munsen, the court of appeals has
relied on Mendoza in applying a clearly erroneous standard of
review to its evaluation of a trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion.

State v. Roth, No. 910100-CA (Utah App.

Feb. 21, 1992) (Bench, Billings, Russon, JJ.)/ State v. Robinson,
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (Davidson, Billings, Jackson,
JJ.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990)
(Billings, Greenwood, Orme, JJ.); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935,
941-42 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, Orme, Davidson, JJ.). See also
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991) (Jackson,
Bench, Russon, JJ.)/ State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 509-10 (Utah
App. 1989) (Bench, Billings, Greenwood, JJ.) (reviewing the trial
court's finding of reasonable suspicion under a clearly erroneous
standard without expressly relying on Mendoza).
Notwithstanding Mendoza's directive, and its own
precedent, the court of appeals has recently expressed confusion
as to the appropriate standard of review to apply to a lower
court's determination of reasonable suspicion.

See, e.g., State

v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 n.6 (Utah 1991) (Billings, Garff,
Orme, JJ.) (questioning whether the trial court's determination
6

of reasonable suspicion is a question of fact or a conclusion of
law); State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135r 138 n.3 (Utah App. 1991)
(Billings, Garff, Russon, JJ.) (citing Carter for the
"problematic issue" of whether a ruling on reasonable suspicion
is a finding of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
or a conclusion of law reviewed under a correction of error
standard).

Although both Carter and Blackwell express confusion

and concern over the appropriate standard of review, neither
panel ultimately resolved the issue.
In Munsen, unlike Carter and Blackwell, the court of
appeals directly reviewed the trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion.

Munsen 821 P.2d at 15. However, contrary

to Carter and Blackwell, the majority in Munsen refused to even
acknowledge Mendoza's directive, and without any analysis or
explanation, included Mendoza in a string cite as support for its
contrary and erroneous treatment of reasonable suspicion as a
mixed question of fact and law, subject to a correction of error
standard of review.

Munsen, 821 P.2d at 15.

The conflict

created by Munsen's application of a correction of error standard
of review has unsettled the precedent in this area and thus
provides a compelling basis for certiorari.

Utah R. App. P.

46(a), (b) and (d). In short, unless and until this Court
disavows Mendoza, the clearly erroneous standard of review is
binding on the court of appeals.2
2

A correct application of Mendoza would require the
court of appeals to affirm the trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion. For, this is a close case, capable of
7

As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, the court of
appeals' application of a correction of error standard of review
in Munsen may well have determined the outcome of the court's
decision.

More importantly, it is in conflict with binding

precedent from this Court and with previous decisions from the
court of appeals. As a result of this conflict, the precedent in
this sensitive area is in need of clarification from this Court.
Therefore, this Court should grant certiorari and review the
court of appeals' decision.

Utah R. App. P. 46(a) (b) and (d).

RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^5 day of February, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

<
wia*A
&&MtIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

supporting a finding either for, or against, reasonable
suspicion; thus, the trial court's determination cannot
reasonably be characterized as against the clear weight of the
evidence. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
Furthermore, as illustrated in Judge Jackson's concurring
opinion, the Munsen panel was not able to reach a "'definite and
firm conviction'ft that the trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion was mistaken. .Id. (citing Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)).
Application of a correction of error standard of review, however,
allowed the court of appeals to ignore the trial court's
determination and reach its own conclusion as to the existence of
reasonable suspicion. Munsen 821 P.2d at 16.
8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Joan C.
Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorney for respondent,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
of February, 1992.

9

84111, this

ADDENDUM

12 Utah

821 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State v. a passenger to drink any alcoholic beverMenke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.1990); age in a motor vehicle, whether or not the
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09 vehicle is moving, stopped or parked on a
highway. See Utah Code Ann. ( 41-6(Utah App.1989).
[9] Moreover, an investigatory deten- 44.20 (1990). In addition, the officer had a
tion must be "temporary and last no longer reasonable basis to suspect the driver of a
than is necessary to effect the purpose of related violation since it is illegal to allow
the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, another to keep, carry, possess or transport
617 (Utah 1987) (citing United States p. an open container of alcohol in the passenMerritU 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), ger compartment of a motor vehicle when
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1142,106 S.Ct 2250, the vehicle is on the highway. Id.
90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986)).
A peace officer has statutory authority
[10] In this case, there was no deten- to "stop any person in a public place when
tion subject to Fourth. Amendment protec- [the officer] has reasonable suspicion to
tion when the police officer initially pulled believe [the person] has committed or is in
in behind the stopped car. Nothing in the the act of committing or is attempting to
record suggests that the officer caused commit a public offense and may demand
Davis to stop the car or that formal investi- his name, address and an explanation of his
gation into possible criminal wrongdoing actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
had begun when the officer first arrived. (1990). Therefore, the officer could properThe car in which Davis was seated had ly approach Davis, and ask for proof of
stopped before the officer arrived, indepen- identification as part of his investigation.
dent of any action taken by the officer,
Based on objective facts learned in the
express or implied, under show of authority
course
of his investigation, the officer had
1
or physical force. Davis had not been
detained by the officer, even momentarily, reasonable grounds to suspect Davis of
and could have reasonably believed that he drunk driving. The officer observed a can
was free to drive away as the officer pulled of beer on the car, smelted a strong odor of
up in his vehicle. MendenhaU, 446 U.S1 at alcohol on Davis's breath, and found him to
be uncooperative and argumentative.
554, 100 S.Ct at 1877.
[11] However, the moment the officer Davis's refusal to produce a driver's license
saw a can of beer on the trunk of the car, also provided grounds to suspect Davis of a
an open passenger door, and a man urinat- license-related violation.
ing, the officer had a reasonable suspicion,
The factual findings of the trial court
based upon objective facts, that a crime that the officer had probable cause were,
had been committed. The officer then de- therefore, not clearly erroneous. The?
tained Davis by a display of authority when were not against the clear weight of evihe activated the overhead lights on his dence, and we are not convinced that a
vehicle. Although there may be a host of mistake was made.
other innocent explanations to account for
The judgment of the trial court is therethe presence of the persons and the things
in and around the car, the officer had a fore affirmed.
reasonable basis to believe that the man
urinating had been a passenger in the car,
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.
and that he had been drinking during the
time he had been a passenger.
(o |nvmmi»snnM>
The officer had a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, of a violation of
the open container law, since it is illegal for
2.

Davis cites several cases for the proposition
that a police officer must have reasonable suspicion to detain for a traffic violation. See Stale
.. C ^ I A . . ^ . in A ntA t i n /!!•_!* mom. e#—#-, ..

Carpenm. 714 PJtd 674 (Utah 1986). Since the
police encounter in this case was not initiated
by a traffic stop for a moving violation, Davis's

STATE v. MUNSEN

Utah 13
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wendy L. MUNSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 910031-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 7, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B.
Brian, J., of possession of controlled substance, and defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Garff, J., held that police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
justify stopping defendant
Reversed and remanded.
Jackson, J., concurred in result and
filed opinion.

court will consider totality of circumstances to determine whether officer had
specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from
those facts, warrant a detention; court will
determine whether officer observed usual
conduct which led him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may have been afoot U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
6. Arrest «=«3.5(4)
To justify a stop, police officer must
have particularized and objective basis for
suspecting particular person stopped of
criminal activity; person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more,,
give rise to probable cause to search that
person. U.S.GA, ConstAmend. 4.

7. Arrest *»C&6<6)
Mere fact that defendant was with person who was engaging in arguably suspi1. Criminal Law **1U4(S)
cious behavior, and with regard to whom
Court of Appeals reviews ultimate con- police officer suspected criminal activity,
clusions drawn from trial court's findings did not conjoin defendant's actions with
as matter of law under correction of error those of the other person so as to give rise
standard, affording no deference to trial to reasonable suspicion to support police
court
officer's stop of defendant U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
2. Criminal Law ••1224(1)
Police officer may approach citizen at ft. Arrest *»«&5(6)
anytime and pose questions so long as citiLateness of hour defendant exited 24ten is not detained against will. U&CA. hour grocery store had no particular signifijostAmend. 4.
icance in evaluating reasonable suspicion to
stop defendant U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
3. Arrest 0>6&5(4, 9)
Police officer may seize person if offi- 9. Arrest «=*3.5(4)
cer has articulable suspicion that person
In determining whether responses to
has committed or is about to commit, crime,
police officer's questioning are evasive and
as long as detention is temporary and lasts
suspicious so as to give rise to reasonable
no longer than is necessary to effectuate
suspicion to stop, police officers may rely
the purpose of stop. U.S.CA. Const
on characteristics of area and behavior of
Amend. 4.
suspect who appears to be evading police
4. Arrest *»63.4(1)
contact UJ3.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
Police officer may arrest suspect if 10. Arrest «=**3.5<9)
officer has probable cause to believe ofDefendant's statement, made in refense has been committed or is being comsponse to police officer's question, that
mitted. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
companion's name was "Hunt" or "Hunt6. Arrest *»*3.5(4)
er" was not inconsistent, vague, and suspi-

14 Utah
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larized and objective basis to suspect defendant of criminal activity, as required to
support detention of defendant, where defendant's responses to other questions by
officer were consistent, direct, and appropriate. U&CA. ConstAmend. 4.
11. Arrest *»63.5(4)
If seizure occurs and police are unable
to point to specific and articulable facts
that justified seizure, seizure violates
Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained
as a result must be excluded. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
GARFF, Judge:
Wendy L. Munsen, appeals the trial
court's order denying her motion to suppress, which resulted in her conviction for
possession of a controlled substance. We
reverse and remand.
Because the court's findings are not at
issue, we rely on the court's findings of
facts. On November 26, 1989, at about
8:30 a.m., Officer Jeff Jensen of the Midvale City Police was patrolling the parking
lot of Smith's Food King in Midvale, Utah.
This store is open twenty-four hours a day.
Officer Jensen observed a pickup truck
parked "by itself in the lot On closer
observation, he noticed a man lying on the
seat of the truck, apparently working with
the car stereo.
Officer Jensen questioned the man, who
identified himself as Alan Hunter. The
vehicle registration, which Hunter produced at the officer's request, indicated that
someone other than Hunter owned the vehicle. Hunter stated he had purchased the
truck at a pawnshop. Officer Jensen noticed a driver's license on the seat of the
truck. The license listed a woman's name
and bore the photograph of a woman.

where the license came from. He offered
that it might belong to his girlfriend, who
he said, was in the store.
During this questioning, Officer Jensen
noticed appellant Wendy L. Munsen exit
the supermarket and walk in the direction
of the truck. There were no other vehicles
or people near Officer Jensen and Hunter.
Officer Jensen intercepted Munsen to see
whether she could confirm Hunter's explanation about who he was and what he was
doing, and to see whether she had a role in
any possible criminal activity.
Officer Jensen asked Munsen if she
knew Hunter. She replied that she had
known him for one year, and that his name
was "Hunt" or "Hunter." Officer Jensen
then had Munsen wait in the patrol car
while he obtained field card information
and ran a warrants check on her. Because
the check on Munsen turned up several
outstanding warrants, Officer Jensen arrested her. During a search of Munsen's
person, incident to her arrest, Officer Jensen discovered the controlled substance,
methamphetamine. Munsen was later
charged with possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony.
On January 3, 1990, Munsen moved to
suppress all evidence seized from her on
the ground that the detention and search of
her person violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court
denied the motion, concluding that Officer
Jensen's actions "were reasonable and
proper under the circumstances" because
of the "inconsistent, vague and suspicious
answers received from the defendant and
Mr. Hunter." On February 2, 1990, Munsen entered a conditional plea of guilty to
the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, preserving her right to appeal
the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress.
[1] Munsen does not challenge the
court's findings. Rather she challenges
the court's application of the law to those
findings. We "review the ultimate conclusions drawn from those findings as a matter of law, under a correction of error
•tan/toMl

•ffmviinflr nn fb»ff»r*»fM*» ftn the

STATE v. MUNSEN
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trial court State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561,
565 (Utah App.1991). See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987); State v.
Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 n. 6 (Utah App.
1991). See also United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th
Cir.1989) (setting forth the generally held
view that whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question of fact and law,
and the trial court's ultimate conclusion
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal
conclusion which is reviewed de novo).
INITIAL DETENTION
12-4] Munsen asserts that her initial detention, while Officer Jensen ran a warrants check on her, violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Both parties agree that this detention was a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment Therefore, the issue is whether Officer Jensen had any reasonable suspicion
justifying the detention.1
The United States Supreme Court first
articulated the requirement that an officer
must have a reasonable suspicion to stop a
person in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88
S.Ct 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
This concept was later codified in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

tion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct at
1880; United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S.
411, 418, 101 S.Ct 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981). The articulable facts, along with
the rational inferences, "must be seen and
weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed
in the field of law enforcement" Cortex,
449 U.S. at 418,101 S.Ct at 695. Thus, we
review the basis for the intrusion to determine whether the officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot...." Terry,
892 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct at 1884.

[5] We also consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the officer had "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts," warrant a deten-

[6,7] Our analysis must focus on Officer Jensen's reasonable suspicions as to
Munsen and not Hunter. The officer
"must have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity." Cortex, 449
U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct at 695 (emphasis
added). See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 91, 100 S.Ct 838, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238
(1979). The mere fact that Munsen was
with Hunter does not necessarily conjoin
her actions with his. A "person's mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at
91, 100 S.Ct at 342. See Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S.Ct 2637, 2641, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (mere presence in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593,
68 S.Ct 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) ("Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be
indulged from mere meetings."); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no
reasonable suspicion where man walking
near defendant had run away).

1. We recognize three levels of police-citizen encounters, each of which requires a different
degree of justification to be constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
(1) (A]n officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2)
an officer may seize a person if the officer has
an "articulable suspicion" that the person has

however, the "detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop;" (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or Is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Merritt, 736 FJd 223. 230 (5th Cir.1984)).
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the conclusoryfindingin light of the specific findings as .- her answers. To wit:
Munsen was aaked if she knew Hunter and
she answered affirmatively. She was
asked who owned the driver's license, and
she responded that she did not know who
owned it nor how it got in the truck. She
was asked how long she knew him and she
said she had known him about a year. So
[8] The lateness of the hour, as it refar, her answers were consistent, direct,
lates to the twenty-four hour grocery store,
and appropriate. Finally, she was asked
has no particular significance when evaluthe name of her companion, and she anating reasonable suspicion. State v. Men- swered that it was Hunt or Hunter. This
doza, 748 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1987) is the only answer that could even possibly
provides an apt analogy. The court in be considered equivocal. However, this anMendoza held that the fact that a car was swer is not inconsistent, vague and suspistopped at 4:50 a.m. on an interstate high- cious.1 More to the point, her answer, conway was of "little relevance" because sidered in light of the totality of the cir"travelers use the interstate highway at all cumstances, did not reasonably create a
times of the day and night
" Id. See particularized and objective basis to susalso State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 pect Munsen of any criminal activity.
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (no reasonable
[11] We therefore conclude that the trisuspicion to stop vehicle with out-of-state
plates moving slowly through frequently al court erred in ruling that Officer Jensen
burglarized neighborhood at 3:00 a.m.); 8 had a reasonable suspicion to justify the
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c) at level two seizure of Munsen. Thus, the
456 (lateness of hour should be considered evidence obtained as a result of the illegal
in relation to other factors including "the detention should be suppressed. "If a seilocation—its remoteness, available lighting, zure occurs and the police are unable to
the presence of others nearby and its acces- point to the specific and articulable facts
that justified that seizure, the seizure viosibility.").
The court made a conclusory finding that lates the fourth amendment of the United
her answers were "inconsistent, vague and States Constitution, and evidence obtained
suspicious." Although the court labels this as a result of the illegal seizure must be
a "finding," it is more accurately character- excluded." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786 (citized as a conclusion. See State v. Vigil, ing Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct at 1876).
Accordingly, we reverse the order deny816 P.2d 1296, 1297-99 (Utah App.1991)
(distinction between findings of facts and ing Munsen's motion to suppress, and thus
conclusions of law based on substantive the resulting conviction. We remand for
analysis notwithstanding label applied by further proceedings consistent with this
trial court). This "finding" actually ap- opinion.
pears to summarize the previous, more speRUSSON, J., concurs.
cific findings relating Munsen's answers to
Officer Jensen's questions.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring in result
[9,10] Therefore, in determining wheth- only):
er the findings adequately support a conI would reach the same result with difclusion of reasonable suspicion, we view ferent analysis. Although the officer had

In the present case, the court found that
Munsen was first seen emerging from a
twenty-four hour grocery store at 3:30
a.m., walking toward Hunter's truck, which
was parked by itself, with no other vehicles
or people in the area. The court made no
findings as to the lighting, the remoteness,
or the accessibility of the area.

2. In evaluating evasive and suspicious responses
we have held that a defendant's nervous conduct when questioned by an officer "is consistent with innocent as well as with criminal be-

the area,' and the behavior of a suspect who
appears to be evading police contact." United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 VS. 544, 564. 100
SCt. 1870. 1882. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting

STATE v. MUNSEN
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reasonable suspicion to justify Munsen's
detention, I think the length and scope of
the detention was not justified
*~w.-...w«a by
mrj the
MIC cirUl'
cumstances. The warrants check was excessive without further inquiry. State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763-764 (Utah

1 T

1991). Cf. State v Holmes. 774 P2d ttifi
(Utah App.198^
^
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No-

910031-CA

Wendy L. Munsen,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Russon.
This matter is before the Court upon appellee's petition
for rehearing, filed 21 November 1991.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is
denied.

id
Dated this\J
BY THE

day of January 1992.

Norij^n H. Jackson^oudge
I dissent,
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